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V. EVIDENCE
A. Admissibility of "Other Crimes" Evidence in a Criminal
Prosecution-United States v. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1974).
The admissibility of evidence of criminal conduct other than that
for which the accused is on trial is being interpreted in a new light in
recent years. The opinion of the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
DiZenzol is indicative of this trend.
In DiZenzo, the defendant was charged with selling counterfeit
obligations of the United States. 2 At trial, the government estab-
lished its case mainly through the testimony of Eugene Powell, an
accomplice, who confessed to purchasing counterfeit obligations from
the defendant and to re-selling them to Peter Gorbea, an informant
cooperating with the investigations. After presenting its proof of the
transaction charged in the indictment, the government was permit-
ted to introduce evidence of similar acts of the defendant. This evi-
dence consisted of three conversations between DiZenzo and Gorbea,
two of which were recorded, and a recorded telephone conversation
between DiZenzo and Powell. The first two DiZenzo-Gorbea discus-
sions occurred about six weeks after the alleged offense and concerned
supplying Gorbea with counterfeit money. DiZenzo also discussed
stolen credit cards, weapons, and wagering.3 In another conversation,
the defendant once again spoke of stolen credit cards, the purchase
of guns, illegitimate driver's licenses, and a stolen shipment of per-
fume to be purchased by DiZenzo. He elaborated on the availability
of counterfeit currency, the difficulties in passing large counterfeits,
the amount of currency he would furnish to Gorbea, the methods of
making counterfeits appear legitimate, and a prior sale of counterfeit
money from DiZenzo to Powell, the person to whom the defendant
was charged with selling counterfeit money in the indictment.4 Di-
Zenzo also showed Gorbea a counterfeit twenty dollar bill, which the
latter described as being similar in both appearance and serial num-
ber to the currency he received from DiZenzo through Powell.
The recorded telephone conversation between the defendant and
Powell took place about nine weeks after the offense charged in the
indictment. In the conversation, DiZenzo indicated that he would
1 500 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1974).
2 18 U.S.C. § 473 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever. . . sells. . . any. . . counterfeited. . . obligation or other
security of the United States, with the intent that the same be passed,
published, or used as true and genuine, shall be [punished].
3 Brief for Appellee at 3, United States v. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d at 263 (4th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 3-4.
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supply Powell with more of "that stuff" at the right price.5 The con-
versation also included a reference to the kidnapping of Carlo Gam-
bino's son in New York.6
The trial court allowed the recordings to be offered into evidence,
but ordered those portions not relating to counterfeit currency de-
leted.7 DiZenzo was convicted and appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On appeal, the defendant
contended that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of the other
sales. The court of appeals, however, found that the probative value
of the evidence outweighed the risk of undue prejudice to the accused,
and affirmed the conviction.'
The court employed a two-step process in analyzing the admissi-
bility of evidence relating to similar acts of the accused. Initially, it
determined the relevance of the questioned evidence. The statute
which DiZenzo was charged with violating required that the defen-
dant knowingly sold counterfeit currency with the intent that it be
passed as genuine.' The court reasoned that as a result of his denial
of the charge, the defendant placed in issue every element of the
alleged crime.1" Thus, the recordings were deemed relevant to show
DiZenzo's knowledge and intent." The exhibition of the $20 counter-
feit bill served to link the defendant's words with his crime. Also, the
fact that the conversations occurred after the alleged crime did not
affect the relevancy of the recordings since criminal intent may be
inferred from subsequent as well as prior acts. 2 Nor were the later
conversations too remote in time to render the discussions irrele-
vant. 
3
The court pointed out, however, that merely because evidence of
similar acts is relevant is not determinative of its admissibility. Once
relevance has been established, the court must then decide "whether
the probative value of the evidence 'is outweighed by the risk that its
5 Id. at 4.
Id.
7 500 F.2d at 266.
8 Id. at 265-66.
1 See note 2 supra.
10 500 F.2d at 265, citing Flaherty v. United States, 355 F.2d 924, 926 (1st Cir.
1966).
The court of appeals found that:
[DiZenzo's] subsequent conversations disclosed his cost for the coun-
terfeits and the prices he charged, the quality of the bills, and his
source of supply. All of this was relevant to his knowledge and intent.
500 F.2d at 265.
I2 Id., citing Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.).332, 361 (1842).
IS Id., citing United States v. Corry, 183 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1950) (3 Year
interval).
1975]
542 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII
admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice to the
accused.'"" Important factors in assessing probative value not only
include relevancy, but also the reliability and necessity of the evi-
dence. The reliability requirement presented no difficulty in
DiZenzo. The government established that the taped recordings were
genuine through the testimony of those actually involved in the con-
versations. Moreover, the unrecorded conversation between the de-
fendant and Gorbea was consistent with the recorded discussions.
Thus, the accuracy of DiZenzo's words was sufficiently assured.
The court of appeals further found that the evidence of the similar
acts was necessary to the government's case. The facts of the crime
itself" were such that the jury could have reasonably inferred that
DiZenzo had no knowledge that the package he delivered to Powell
contained counterfeit money that would be passed as genuine. Thus,
the evidence of the recorded conversations was necessary to provide
reliable proof of the defendant's knowledge and intent.
The second step of the court's process was to determine that the
defendant had not been unduly prejudiced by the evidence. The court
of appeals found that the trial judge reduced any threat of undue
prejudice by taking three precautionary measures. First, only those
parts of the recordings that related directly to counterfeiting were
admitted. The extraneous references to credit cards, weapons, wager-
ing and kidnapping were deleted. The trial judge also required exci-
sion of all derogatory ethnic comments. Finally, the trial court in-
structed the jury not to consider the evidence of similar acts unless
and until it found by independent evidence that DiZenzo had sold
counterfeit currency as charged in the indictment." As a result, the
court of appeals found that the undoubted probative value of the
evidence of similar acts outweighed the reduced risk of undue preju-
dice. Thus, the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting
the evidence.17
1 Id. at 265-66, quoting United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
The court of appeals found the following:
The facts of DiZenzo's sale of counterfeit bills were sparse. Powell
testified that DiZenzo told him he had counterfeit money or access to
it. Later in the same month or early in the next, DiZenzo delivered to
him a wrapped package without saying anything about its contents
that Powell could recall. There was no testimony that the package was
opened in DiZenzo's presence. Three or four days later Powell paid
DiZenzo $250 for the counterfeits, which had a face value of $1,000.
Id. at 266.
'e Brief for Appellee at 14, United States v. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1974).
" 500 F.2d at 266.
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The court's two-step analysis of the issue presented in DiZenzo
provides a good example of the trend in several recent federal deci-
sions."s The established rule has been that evidence of other similar
offenses was inadmissible in a criminal prosecution, subject to certain
exceptions, such as those relating to the establishment of the defen-
dant's intent, motive, handiwork, scheme or design. 9 If the evidence
could be classified as one of these traditional exceptions, only then
was it admissible. This mechanistic approach has been subject to
criticism,"0 and the rule of exclusion has become the exception rather
than the standard. Consequently, evidence of similar acts was admit-
ted if it was relevant to any particular issue before the court. The
Fourth Circuit noted that:
• . . while the general rule excludes evidence of similar acts for
the purpose of depicting the evil character of the accused,
exceptions that are justified by relevance to pertinent issues
permit its introduction in a variety of situations. Indeed, evi-
dence of similar acts is relevant to so wide and unclassifiable
a range of issues that the exclusionary rule has become one of
qualified admissibility, aptly phrased: "Evidence of other of-
fenses may be received if relevant for any purpose other than
to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the
defendant to commit the crime .. "I'
Despite the court's recognition of the liberal trend of admissibil-
" See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 979 (1974); United States v. Hines, 470 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 968 (1973); Dirring v. United States, 328 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 1003 (1964).
"1 The reason for this rule was that, although this type of evidence was certainly
probative to prove the criminal propensity of the defendant, especially when the crimi-
nal conduct was similar to the crime with which he was charged, it was also highly
prejudicial. Its impact may cause a jury to find the accused guilty on the basis that
he had been shown to have criminal inclinations generally, rather than on the basis of
his culpability for the specific crime alleged. United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571,
576 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 212 (1960). See C. McCoRMICK,
LAW OF EVIDENcE, § 190 (2d ed. 1972).
2 As Professor McCormick points out:
[H]ere there is danger that if judges, trial and appellate, content
themselves with merely determining whether the particular evidence
of other crimes does or does not fit in one of the approved classes, they
may lose sight of the underlying policy of protecting the accused
against unfair prejudice. The policy may evaporate through the inters-
tices of the classification.
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 190 at 453 (2d ed. 1972).
22 500 F.2d at 265, quoting United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 576 (3d Cir.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
19751
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ity, the Fourth Circuit apparently chose to curtail the expansion of
this rule. By requiring that the trial court weigh the probative value
of the evidence against its possible prejudicial effect, the Fourth Cir-
cuit seems to have achieved its goal. The DiZenzo court stated that:
Evidence of similar acts . . . may not be admitted simply
because the extraneous conduct is relevant or because it falls
within one or more of the traditional exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule. The district judge, in the exercise of sound discre-
tion, must also determine whether the probative value of the
evidence "is outweighed by the risk that its admission will
create a substantial danger of undue prejudice to the ac-
cused." 
2
This approach has the support of Professor McCormick, who has
pointed out that:
[S]ome of the wiser opinions (especially recent ones) recog-
nize that the problem is not merely one of pigeonholding, but
one of balancing, on the one side, the actual need for the other-
crimes evidence in light of the issues and the other evidence
available to the prosecution [this is the necessity requirement
in DiZenzo], the convincingness of the evidence that the other
crimes were committed and that the accused was the actor
[the reliability requirement of DiZenzo], and the strength or
weakness of the other-crimes evidence in supporting the issue
[the relevance requirement in DiZenzo], and on the other, the
degree to which the jury will probably be roused by the evi-
dence to overmastering hostility.?
The advantages of this balancing approach are readily obvious.
Since the principle purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to protect
the defendant against unfair prejudice, 4 the judge has the discretion-
ary power to exclude the evidence, even though it may be substan-
tially relevant. Thus, the defendant is assured, as far as possible, that
he will receive a fair trial. No longer will evidence of similar acts be
admitted merely because it fits into one of the established exceptions
or because it is relevant. It must also meet the "probative value
versus prejudicial effect" standard.
S.D.R.
500 F.2d at 265-66, quoting United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974) (emphasis added).
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EvDE.NcE, § 190 at 453 (2d ed. 1972).
, See note 20 supra.
